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Abstract: This paper uses a rational expectations macroeconomic model in which economic agents formulate 
the probability about the sustainability of the economic policy—that is, policy credibility—using current and 
lagged values of government expenditures and lagged values of the inflation rate. The estimation of the model is 
based on Hamilton’s switching regime procedure. The contribution of this paper is the empirical estimation of 
the credibility of the stabilization program implemented in Peru in August 1990. The results of the estimation 
show that there are two different regimes in the government expenditure process. According to the economic 
agents’ inferences, the stabilization program in Peru is not credible. This lack of credibility in the economic 
policy of the government authority explains the presence of hysteresis in currency substitution between August 
1990 and June 1995. The estimation involves an expected inflation rate that includes the credibility of the 
economic policy in its formulation. 
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1. Introduction  
A policy is credible when economic agents expect policymakers to be successful in 
implementing their announced economic program. Economic policies are more effective when 
they are credible to economic agents.  In the context of stabilization policies, credibility will help 
to bring inflationary expectations down and to achieve the goal of disinflation.  On the other 
hand, the lack of policy credibility brings an additional restriction to the economic programs 
implemented by policy authorities.  If economic agents believe that the stabilization program 
will fail, and the inflation rate will not be reduced, they will allocate some of their monetary 
assets in foreign currency to offset the loss in their purchasing power. This behavior restricts the 
base of the inflation tax and imposes more uncertainty on the control of money supply. 
  The lack of policy credibility involves a learning process where the economic agents 
have observed a prior lack of commitment by the policy authority in continuing the announced 
policy.  The level of credibility is related to the time-inconsistency problem in the 
implementation of economic policies.  The policy authority will not fully commit to its economic 
program because, after its announcement, there will be short run incentives to repudiate the 
original plan.  These incentives come from a lack of control of the policy instruments, 
inconsistency between economic policies, political and administrative constraints and 





  During the 1980s, several Latin American countries experienced failed stabilization 
programs.  On several occasions, the failure of stabilization programs was due to the lack of 
commitment to reduce the fiscal deficit.  This was due to the lack of control of policy 
instruments such as in the Austral Plan in Argentina, the Cruzado Plan in Brazil or the Inti Plan 
in Peru.  On other occasions, the previous failure of these programs has contributed to the lack of 
credibility in economic policy even though the governments have shown greater commitment 
and consistency in their economic programs in the recent years. 
In this study, I examine the credibility of stabilization policies and its effect on the 
hysteresis present in the process of currency substitution.  Due to the lack of credibility in 
stabilization policies, economic agents may have maintained high expectations of both inflation 
and depreciation of the domestic currency.  Even if inflation rates decrease and exchange rates 
become more stable, the lack of policy credibility may cause economic agents to continue 
holding their assets in foreign currency.  They will continue to keep their deposits in foreign 
currency because they expect that the policy authority will abandon their policy. Therefore, this 
is the best way that the economic agents can protect their assets. 
The contribution of this paper is the empirical estimation of the credibility of the 
stabilization program implemented in Peru in August 1990. Policy credibility is measured as the 
probability inferred by the economic agents about the sustainability of the economic policy using 
current and lagged values of government expenditures and lagged values of the inflation rate. 
The results of the estimation show that there are two different regimes in the government 
expenditure process.  According to the economic agents’ inferences, the stabilization program in 
Peru is not credible.  This lack of credibility in the economic policy of the government authority  
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explains the presence of hysteresis in currency substitution between August 1990 and June 
1995.  The estimation involves an expected inflation rate that includes the credibility of the 
economic policy in its formulation. 
The next section contains the literature review. Section 3 presents the theoretical model. 
Section 4 includes the estimation of this model using Hamilton’s switching regime approach. 
The results of this estimation for the case of Peru are discussed in section 5. Finally, conclusions 
are drawn. 
 
2. Literature review  
There is no unified framework to study policy credibility despite its importance in the 
implementation and success of economic policy.  The theoretical models of credibility have 
concentrated on the analysis of the strategic behavior of the economic agents and the policy 
authority, and on the interaction of policy instruments and its effects on policy credibility
2.  
However, this wide theoretical study of policy credibility has not been followed by similar 
studies on empirical testing and estimation of policy credibility
3. One of the problems of the 
empirical testing of policy credibility is that it is a difficult variable to measure.  Also theoretical 
models have not contributed to the empirical work on this topic because they are static, 
deterministic and deal with few macro variables (Blackburn and Christensen 1989). 
 
2 For a literature review of the theoretical work on credibility see Blackburn and Christensen (1989), 
Drazen and Masson (1994), and Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996). 
 
3 Blackburn and Christensen (1989), Agenor and Taylor (1992) and Quispe-Agnoli (1997) are some 
studies that review the empirical work on credibility.  
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  In the estimation of credibility, it is important to remember that credibility is related to 
forward-looking expectations of the economic agents on the likelihood the announced economic 
policy will continue.  One of the problems is to choose the appropriate variable or set of 
variables that will be the basis for the formation of these expectations. This variable should 
measure a learning process and the characteristics of policy credibility that varies over time.  
Policy credibility is endogenous, and unobserved process postulated to be responsive to 
economic policy. Regarding the estimation technique, credibility models do not present the 
linear characteristics necessary to applied traditional econometric techniques.  Non-linear 
techniques are more adequate for its estimation that could include the updating nature of the 
credibility process. 
 
3. Theoretical model  
The objective of this theoretical model is to explain the role of credibility in the performance of 
economic policy.  Credibility is defined as the probability that the announced economic policy 
will be continued.  If disinflationary policy lacks credibility, economic agents will anticipate its 
breakdown, and will allocate their monetary holdings in foreign currency.  If a process of 
currency substitution has already occurred and the economic policy lacks credibility, agents will 
remain in their current situation and will not be encouraged to switch back to domestic currency.  
In this case, hysteresis in the currency substitution process is explained by the lack of policy 
credibility. 
  This structural model of inflation was developed by Ruge-Murcia (1995). He applied it to 





In this macroeconomic model, the growth rate of real balances depends on inflationary 
expectations and the real interest rate differential. The money supply is one of the main sources 
to finance the fiscal deficit.  Consequently, the growth rate of money supply is influenced by the 
behavior of government expenditures and revenues. The economic agents will allocate their real 
balances between different currencies based on their information about inflation and interest 
rates, and the level of government expenditures.  The level of government expenditures is a 
signal of the commitment of the economic authority towards the announced economic program.  
Consequently, policy credibility is measured by the probability that changes in fiscal policy are 
consistent with the targets of the disinflationary program.  
  Assume that the demand for money can be expressed with unit income elasticity as 
follows 
mpy i w h e r e t
d
tt t t −=− + > αε α       1  
where mt
d, pt and yt are the natural logarithms of money demand, the price level and real income. 
i t is the nominal interest rate and εt is a disturbance term that follows a random 
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In (1), the nominal interest rate (it) is defined as  
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where rt is the real interest rate and E(πt+1|It) is the forward inflationary expectation conditional 
to the information set at time t (It). This information set includes past information about inflation, 
nominal interest rates, and government expenditures. 
Substituting (2) in (1) gives 
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Therefore, the expression for the change in real balances follows 
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where    is the growth rate of nominal money demand,   is the 
inflation rate,  , assuming a constant growth rate of income.  Also the change in the 
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Therefore, the growth rate of demand for real balances can be rewritten as  
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The growth rate of money demand depends on the inflation rate, inflationary expectations and 
the change in the real interest rate. The coefficient α denotes the sensitivity of money demand to 
changes in inflationary expectations. 
On the other hand, changes in the money supply will be determined mainly by the 
financing of the fiscal deficit with high-powered money. The growth rate of money supply can 
be written as 
ϑγ ς γ ς σ ς t
s
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where  is the growth rate of money supply and the fiscal deficit (D ϑ t
s
t) is the difference between 
government expenditures (Gt) and revenues (Tt),  




The fiscal deficit, government expenditures and revenues are measured as percentage of Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP).  Tax revenues depend on the lagged values of the inflation rate. When 
the inflation rate increases, the real value of tax revenues declines. Tax revenues are expressed as  
Th tt t t t = −−− − ( , , ,....., ) πππ π 123         8  
Assuming that the lagged value of the inflation rate is the relevant variable, the tax function 
becomes  
Tw h e r e a n d i i d tt t t =− + > − τϕ π η τ ϕ η σ η 1
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Using the definitions of the fiscal deficit and tax revenues in equations (7) and (9), the growth 
rate of money supply is  
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s
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rearranging  
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The final expression for the change in money supply is  
ϑγ ψ π ς t
s
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where c = a-γτ , ψ = γϕ >0 and the error term ς t includes the term -γη t.  The money supply is 
determined by government expenditures and the inflation rate that decreases the real value of tax 
revenues. This decline in real tax revenues also increases the fiscal deficit.  In equation (12), the 
money supply is endogenous and influenced by government expenditures and the previous 
inflation rate. 
The solution of the model is found by assuming equilibrium in the money market and therefore 
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rearranging the terms, the following expression will be useful in the derivation of the equation 
for the inflation rate and the change in interest rate,  
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2
µ) 
Taking expectations at time t-1, (14) becomes a second-order difference equation with roots 
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The solution for inflationary expectations is    
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where κ=(n-c)/α(1−λ) and γ/α>0. According to (15), the inflationary expectations are positively 
related to the lagged values of the inflation rate and to the weighted sum of expected future 
government expenditures.  The expression for inflationary expectations also includes a term that 
shows that economic agents compare the expected and the realized levels of government 
expenditures.  If the government decreases their expenditures more than the announced level, it 
will decrease inflationary expectations.  
  The solution for the inflation rate comes from substituting (15), and (15) one period 
forward into (14), 
 
4 A detailed solution of the model is available from the author.  
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  According to (16), the inflation rate is a function of its lagged value, the difference 
between the actual and the agents’ expectations of the behavior of the government conditional on 
the information at time t and t-1, the error made by the economic agents at time t and t-1, and the 
difference in the expectations of the future behavior of the government conditional to the current 
and past information. 
The inflation rate increases if the economic agents see a high government expenditure 
regime in the past or if they expect one in the future. The structure of the error terms is explained 
by the assumption that the information set does not include the current values of the economic 
variables or the lagged value of the inflation rate (Ruge-Murcia 1995). 
The rational expectation solution for the change in the nominal interest rate follows from 
equation (2) 
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The solution for the change of the interest rate is obtained by substituting (16), (15), and (15) 
forwarded one period into (17),  
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The change of the interest rate is influenced directly by previous values of the inflation rate and 
government expenditures.  
  The theoretical framework presented in this section is a rational expectations model of 
inflation where the money supply is influenced by the financing of the government deficit.  In 
this model, the economic agents will make their decisions about the allocation of their assets by 
reviewing the previous and current level of government expenditures.  Credibility is measured by 
the probability the economic policy will be continued given the information from previous 
periods. This probability is built by the joint observation of inflation and interest rates and 
government expenditures. 
Previous studies of policy credibility used univariate models where the variable of 
interest is in function of its lagged values.  For example, the expectations of economic agents 
were modeled by changes in the inflation rate or in the exchange rate premium depending on 
their lagged values. Other studies analyze policy credibility by concentrating on the changes in 
policy tools, i.e. reduction of government expenditures or discipline in the expansion of the 
money supply, estimating its consistency with the targets of the economic policy.  This model 
incorporates both approaches.  The economic agents take into account not only previous values 
of inflation rates but they consider the market fundamentals for their behavior.  They use both 




                                                
   
4. Empirical model 
For the derivation of the empirical model, the process of government expenditures follows an 
autoregressive process subject to discrete regime switches. Government expenditures can be 
expressed as 
GG ts t s tt =+ + − βφ σ 1     
where st characterizes the state or regime of the government expenditure process at time t. 
Assuming that there are two regimes, one of high government expenditures(st = 1) and a second 
one of low government expenditures (st = 2), then the process of government expenditures will 
be characterized by two different stochastic segmented trends
5.  Therefore, depending on the 
regime, government expenditures are distributed N(βst/(1-φ), σ
2
st/(1-φ)).  The error term, εt, is an 
i.i.d. N(0,1).  
  It is assumed that the state variable follows a Markov chain, where the current state of 
government expenditures will depend on its previous value.  Consequently the transition 
probabilities can be derived 
P(st = 1| st-1 = 1) = p11     P(st = 2| st-1 = 1) = p12 = 1 - p11 
P(st = 1| st-1 = 2) = p21 = 1 - p22  P(st = 2| st-1 = 2) = p22 




















where p12 = Pr(st = 2|st-1 = 1)  denotes the probability, at time t, that the government 
expenditure is at the low expenditure regime (st = 2) given that it was at the high expenditure 
regime (st-1 = 1) the previous period.  
  The economic agents observe the process of government expenditures but they do not 
now its regime. Therefore, they formulate probabilities regarding the state of the government 
expenditure process. In their inference, the economic agents use all available information. 
According to the theoretical model, this information comes from the joint process of inflation 
and interest rates, and previous values of government expenditures.  The measurement of the 
policy credibility is based on these probabilities.  If, after the announcement of an economic 
program, the economic agents conclude that the joint process of inflation, interest rates and 
government expenditure is generated by a high expenditure regime, then this program lacks 
credibility. 
According to the theoretical model, the transition probabilities are expressed as Pr(st-1= 2|It), 
denoting the  probability inferred at time t by the economic agents about the expenditure regime 
at time t-1, given the information set that includes the joint process of inflation, interest rates and 
government expenditure.  If Pr(st-1= 2|It) > 0.5, then the program is credible at time t, otherwise if 
Pr(st-1= 2|It) < 0.5, then the economic program is not credible. 
Substituting (1) and the matrix of transition probabilities into the theoretical model, the reduced 
form is: 
GG ts t t s t =+ + − βφ σ ε 1  
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0 and H = (P+λδI)P(λI-P)
-1. The vector B = [β1, β2]’ includes the 
values of the state dependent constant. The vector Lt-1 = [Pr(st-1= 1|It) Pr(st-1= 2|It)] includes the 
probabilities built by the economic agents about the regime of the government expenditure at 
time t-1.  The term (Lt-1 - Lt-2) shows the revision of their probabilities about government 
expenditures as the economic agents obtained more information. P is the matrix with the 
transition probabilities and I is the identity matrix.  
  According to the model, the inflation rate and the interest rate differential depend on the 
lagged value of the inflation rate, the previous levels of government expenditures and the 
probabilities built by the economic agents about the state of government expenditures. This last 
term (Lt-1 - Lt-2)HB includes the revision of the government expenditures given additional 




The estimation of this model implements Hamilton’s procedure to estimate state-space models 
when the state variable is discrete.  This nonlinear procedure estimates structural parameters 
through the maximization of the likelihood function.  From the reduced form of the model, Θ 
defines the set of parameters (β1, β2 , σ1 , σ2 , σu , σv , p11 , p22 , ρeu, k, γ , λ , λ1 ,φ ), and St = {st , 
st-1 } defines the states of the government expenditures process. Zt is defined as Zt = [Gt , πt, ∆it  ]  
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the vector of dependent variables. Recalling the assumption of normal distribution for εt , ut , 
vt , then the conditional density for a given observation of the system is  
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The variance and covariance of the residuals is given by 
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where ρeu is the correlation coefficient between εt and ut. 
  The estimation starts with the unconditional probabilities given by P(st = 1) = (1-p22)/ (2- 
p11- p22) and P(st = 2) = (1-p11)/ (2- p11- p22).  The filter works recursively taking these 
probabilities and the conditional likelihood of Zt. The value of the likelihood function is 
calculated from  









where N is the number of observations. This likelihood function is maximized numerically with 
respect to Θ in order to obtain the value of the parameters.  Along with this estimation and for 
each iteration, filtered probabilities are calculated. The filtered probabilities are defined as the 
probability of the expenditure process to be in a given state at time t -1 conditional to the 
information set at time t.   
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5. Empirical Results 
The estimation of the empirical model uses data from Peru for September 1988 to June 1995. 
The data includes government expenditures as percentage of GDP, inflation rates and the 
differential between interest rates for deposits in domestic and foreign currency.  First, the data is 
tested for the presence of stationarity. Table 1 shows that none of the variables present unit roots. 
Also, it is necessary to test the validity of the assumptions that were made in the formulation of 
the theoretical and empirical models.  The assumption that government expenditures follow a 
first-order autoregressive process is supported by the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and 
the Schwarz Bayesian Criterion (SBC).  Also the lag length of the other variables was 
determined to be one by these criteria. 
  The first specification of the empirical model consists of three univariate estimations 
where the dependent variables are government expenditures; inflation rate and change in the 
interest rate are obtained using a univariate estimation. These results are shown in Table 2, and 
the filtered probabilities for each variable are grouped in Figures 1 to 3, respectively. All three 
equations show two well-defined regimes, and all estimated coefficients are significantly 
different from zero.  Government expenditures as a percentage of GDP averages 8.2% in the 
high regime and 5.9% in the low regime.  The inflation rate and the change in the interest rate 
display a larger difference in their means in both the high and low regimes.  In the high regime, 
the inflation rate averages 33.2% per month, and in the low regime the average inflation rate 
decreases 19.6 percent points to become 13.6% per month. Also, the substantial reduction in the 
change in the interest rate is 18.8 points.  In the high regime, the mean of the change in the 
interest rate is 19.4 percent points and in the low regime it is 0.7 percentage points.  
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Government expenditures have a greater variance in the high regime (2.35) than in the 
low regime (0.97). The change in the interest rate displays the same pattern, in the high regime 
the variance (356.21) is greater than in the lower regime (0.39). The inflation rate, however, 
shows lower variability in the high regime (71.51) than in the low regime (2687.82). 
According to Table 2, the probability of staying in the same regime as the previous 
period, pii = Pr(st = i|st-1 = i), is high for all three equations.  But the probabilities for the 
government expenditure are the lowest relative to the probabilities for the inflation rate and the 
interest rate differential.  If the inflation rate is at the high regime in the previous period the 
probability of staying in the high regime is equal to 94.1%.  If the inflation rate is in the low 
regime, the probability to continue in the low regime is 98.6%.  The change in the interest rate 
presents the same behavior.  The probability of continuing in the high regime is 94.6%, and in 
the low regime is 98.6%.  On the other hand, the probability that the government expenditure 
will remain in the high regime is 93.5%, and the probability of remaining in the low regime is 
91.8%. The lower probability of persisting in the same regime in government expenditures 
suggests the possibility of lack of credibility in the announced policy. 
By looking at the filtered probabilities and the original series of the variables, it is 
possible to see the time of the switch in beliefs about the regime. Figures 1, 2 and 3 show the 
filtered probabilities at the low regime, st = 2 and Figures 4 and 5 show the original series. The 
filtered probability at st = 2 refers to the probability that the observation at a given date is in the 
low regime. A switch in beliefs about the regime is observed when Pr(st= 2|It) > 0.5. 
In Figure 1, the switch in beliefs about the regime of government expenditures is not as 
obvious as in the other two variables.  In March 1989, it went from belief in high government  
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expenditures to low government expenditures, and back to a high regime in August 1989.  
There is a second switch in beliefs to a low regime in December 1990 as part of the stabilization 
program, but it was interrupted in October 1992. There is an additional temporary change in 
beliefs to a lower rate of government expenditures in January 1993, but it went back to belief in 
the high regime in September 1994. In Figure 2, the probability goes from the low inflation 
regime to the high inflation in September 1988 and returns to low inflation in July 1990, as a 
result of the orthodox stabilization plan by Alberto Fujimori.  The same pattern is shown by the 
interest rate differential in Figure 3, switching to belief in a low regime in October of 1990. 
During the 1980s, high government expenditures were financed with increases in the 
money supply resulting in high inflation rates. Before September 1988, the policy authority in 
Peru implemented a heterodox price control program.  Prices were liberalized in September 
1988, which resulted in high inflation rates. Inflation rates remained high, even though 
government expenditures declined.  This suggests a lack of credibility in the attempt to reduce 
government expenditures as part of a disinflationary program. Inflation rates only went down 
after the new government implemented the stabilization program. Low level of government 
expenditures reinforced this behavior, with some important interruptions in October 1992 and 
September 1994.  A similar case occurs with the interest rate differential.  Interest rates were 
allowed to fluctuate along with the liberalization of the financial system in September 1988.  
Previously, interest rates were controlled by the Central Bank. Between September 1988 and 
September 1991, the interest rate differential reflected inflationary expectations. Even though 
inflation rates went down, the interest rate differential continued to be high, due to the  
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uncertainty and the adjustment in the financial system that the stabilization program brought 
until October 1990. 
The previous analysis is based on the individual behavior of the variables. However, the 
measure of credibility of the economic policy in the theoretical model takes into account the 
interaction of government expenditures and inflation rate. In the bivariate estimation, the values 
for the means, variances and the probabilities are estimated using the joint process of 
government expenditures and inflation rates.  
According to the bivariate model, the process of government expenditures for the period 
between September of 1988 and June of 1995, is described as follows 
G G when s highregime
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(Standard errors are in parentheses). There are two regimes of government expenditures. The 
estimated coefficients in this equation are significantly different from zero at a 90% level of 
confidence. The switch from high to low regime brings a decline in the government expenditure 
of (β1 - β2) = 1.51434 percent of GDP.   Also it brings a decline in the variation of the 
government expenditure process.  In the long run, the decline of the government expenditures 
would be (β1 - β2)/(1-φ) = 2.0640 percent of the GDP. 
The values of the transition probabilities are p11 = 0.94536 (0.0503) and p22 = 0.93100 
(0.0526) for the high and low regimes.  This transition probability indicates that when the 





regime and if the process is at the low regime, this probability is 93.1% to remain in the same 
regime.  Even though, the probabilities are greater than 90%, it does not indicate a strong 
persistence in the process of government expenditures.  By comparison, Ruge-Murcia (1995, 
1997) finds that these probabilities are 99% for p11 and 98.5% for p22 for the case of Israel. 
One of the results of the bivariate estimation is the roots of the second-order difference 
equation in expectations.  The smaller root of the difference equation (λ1) equals to 0.156695 
(0.11189) and the larger root of the difference equation (λ2) is 32567.3 (294084). According to 
the theoretical model, λ1 should be less than one and λ2 greater than one. These estimates are 
used in the calculation of other parameters of the theoretical model. The value of the semi-
elasticity of money demand with respect to the interest rate (α) can be seen 
mpy i t
d
tt t −=− + 0000031 . ξ  
Even though α(=0.000031) is positive its magnitude is smaller than previous empirical 
estimates.  Ruge-Murcia (1995) finds a small coefficient (0.88) but it is still greater than the one 
shown in this case. For the hyperinflationary cases of Poland and Hungary, Cagan (1956) found 
estimates between 2.3 and 8.7 respectively. However it is important to be cautious with the 
estimates of these coefficients due to the lack of statistical significance of these roots and the 
large magnitude of λ2.  
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The constant c cannot be recovered from the estimated parameters.  The coefficient of the 
government expenditures (γ=9.2540 ) is greater than zero and larger than expected.  It is also 
statistically significant at 90% confidence level. It supports the assumption in the theoretical 
model that high-powered money was an important source to finance the fiscal deficit. 
 The estimate of the coefficient of the lagged value of the inflation rate (ψ=0.1567) is 
positive but it is not statistically significant. An increase in the inflation rate in the previous 
period increases the growth rate of money supply in 0.1567 in the current period. These results 
support the introduction of the money supply as an endogenous process. A decline in 
government expenditures due to a switch in the regime would decrease the growth in money 
supply in γ*(β1 - β2) = 9.2540 * 1.5143 = 14.0133 percent points and in the long run by 
9.2540*2.0640 = 19.1%.  The substantial effect of the government expenditures on the growth of 
money supply shows the importance of the use of the newly printed money to finance large fiscal 
deficits during the 1980s.  It is also necessary to be aware that the magnitude of the roots 
contributes to the size of γ. 
  The coefficient for the real tax revenue equation is  
Ttt =− + − τπ η 00169 1 . 
The constant τ cannot be recovered from the estimated parameters.  The estimated coefficient of 
the lagged inflation rate on current tax revenues (ϕ) is negative supporting the theoretical model.  
An increase in the inflation rate at time t-1 will decrease the current real value of the tax 
revenues by 0.0169 percent points, agreeing with the Olivera-Tanzi effect.  Assuming that any 
reduction in government expenditures will bring a similar reduction in the inflation rate, then a 
switch in the government expenditures from high to low regime would increase real tax revenues  
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in ϕ*γ*(β1 - β2) = 0.0169 * 9.2540 * 1.5143 = 0.2368 as a percent of GDP.  The explanation 
of this small effect on the real value tax revenues is that, despite the negative relationship with 
the inflation rate, there are other institutional factors that would improve the efficiency of the tax 
system. After the implementation of the orthodox stabilization program in August 1990 by 
Alberto Fujimori, there was a tax reform that increased the tax base substantially. 
  The estimated coefficients of the inflationary process for Peru are as follows 
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where β1 = 5.8658 (0.5199) and β2 = 4.3223 (0.7732), σ1 = 1.4320 (0.1835) σ2= 1.0093 (0.1891)  
σu= 4.5999 (0.4310).  The correlation coefficient between the disturbance term et and ut is  
ρεu=-0.3705 (0.1647) as expected in the model.  The means and the variances are greater than 
zero and statistically significant. Given that β1 > β2, the inflation rate will be higher in the high 
regime than in the low regime. In this model, the inflation rate depends on the government 
expenditure regimes and the agents’ credibility on the stabilization program.  
One of the most important contributions of these results is the estimation of the effects of 
credibility in the government economic policy on the inflation process.  Looking at the filtered 
probabilities at st = 1 refers to the probability that the observation at a given date is at the high 
regime. A switch in the regime is observed when Pr(st= 1|It) > 0.5. In Figure 6, the probability of 
being at the high government expenditure regime is greater than 0.5, between September 1988 
and January 1991. This coincides with the pre-stabilization period when prices of goods and  
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services were liberalized as well as the financial system, but government expenditures 
remained in the high regime even though there were several attempts to reduce its level. 
The orthodox stabilization program was implemented in August 1990, and it brought a 
sharp decline in the inflation rates and government expenditures (Figure 4).  Despite of this 
decline in these variables, and according to these probabilities, the economic agents did not 
perceive a credible stabilization program until February 1991.  The credibility of the program 
continues until November 1992. Between December 1992 and February 1993, the agents’ 
inference about the government expenditure process is that the probability to switch to the high 
regime increased.  As an anecdotal note, Abimael Guzman, leader of the terrorist group Shining 
Path was captured in November 1992 providing a positive impact to Alberto Fujimori’s 
government. The increase in government expenditures in the subsequent months might have 
been a response to the outburst in popular confidence.  The probability of being in the high 
regime decreases again in March 1993 and credibility continues until August 1994.  In 
September 1994, the agents again infer that the stabilization program lacks credibility when 
government expenditures increase even though inflation rates remain stable and low. This large 
probability to continue in the high regime continues until June 1995.  This increase in 
government expenditures, contrary to the objectives of the stabilization program, can be 
explained by the elections in May 1995.  During this period, Alberto Fujimori increased 
government expenditures in education and health services. 
Figure 7 shows the behavior of the coefficient for a change in the regime component.  
This coefficient displays the economic agents’ inferences about the true regime of the 
government policy using the information of both government expenditures and inflation rates.   
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There is a sharp increase in the coefficient for a change in regime in August 1989, when the 
stabilization program was implemented but there is a sharp decline in both occasions when the 
stabilization program became credible according to our definition (February 1991 and March 
1993).  The coefficient for a change in regime displays a greater variability when the inflation 
rate fluctuates more between March 1993 and June 1995. 
According to the results of the bivariate estimation, the economic agents do not infer that 
the stabilization program is fully credible during the overall period of implementation.  There are 
periods in which this economic policy has gained credibility.  These periods are characterized by 
low inflation rate and government expenditures.  But this credibility is very vulnerable to sudden 
increases in government expenditures. Even if the level of government expenditures does not go 
back to the levels of the high regime and the inflation rates are still low, an increase in 
government expenditures will increase the probability of a switch in the regime and therefore it 
will signal to the economic agents that the stabilization policy might fail.   
Looking at Figures 4 and 6, there is a lag between the actual implementation of the 
stabilization program in August 1990, shown by a decline in government expenditures and 
inflation rate, and the time that economic agents infer that this program is credible, February 
1991. It took six months for the economic agents to evaluate the behavior of the government, 
their information about its current and previous expenditures, and the inflation rate to infer that 





Policy credibility and persistence of dollarization 
One explanation for the presence of hysteresis in currency substitution is the lack of credibility 
in the stabilization program. If the economic agents do not find the economic program credible, 
they will expect high government expenditures and high inflation rates, discouraging the holding 
of domestic currency.  If the agents are already holding foreign currency, this lack of credibility 
will be a disincentive to switch to domestic currency. In Figure 8, the currency substitution ratio, 
defined as the share of deposits in foreign currency in total deposits, decreases in April 1989 and 
increases again after the implementation of the stabilization program in August 1990 to continue 
at an average of 70% until June 1995. 
To test the effect of policy credibility on the process of currency substitution, the 
expected inflation rate is calculated using the lagged value of inflation rate and the filtered 
probabilities from the credibility model.   The expected inflation rate includes the inferences of 
the economic agents about the continuation of the economic program based on their 
observations about government expenditures and inflation rates.  For this estimation, the long 
run formulation for the currency substitution process (Quispe-Agnoli 1997) is used.  According 
to this formulation, the change in the currency substitution ratio depends on the expectations of 
the inflation rate.  Taking the sample from November 1988 to June 1995, the results of the 
estimation are as follows: 
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t-values are in parenthesis. The coefficient of the expected inflation rate is positive but not 




substitution first increases and then declines between November 1988 and June 1990, at the 
same time the expected inflation rate is at the high regime.  However, after the implementation 
of the disinflationary program and the switch of the inflation rate to a lower regime, the currency 
substitution ratio remains at levels 60% or higher. This persistence in currency substitution is 
related to lack of credibility of economic policy.  Therefore, I take the sample only after the 
implementation of the stabilization policy, from August 1990 to June 1995.  The results of this 
estimation are 
∆∆ CS e tt
e





(. ) ( . )
 
t-values are in parenthesis. The coefficient of the expected inflation rate is positive and 
statistically significant.  The expected inflation rate includes the inferences of the economic 
agents about the probability of success of the economic policy as shown in Figure 6. Policy 
credibility will lead to explain the hysteresis phenomenon in currency substitution.  A lack of 
policy credibility explains why the economic agents may decide to keep their monetary assets in 
foreign currency even when the inflation rate is low.  
 
6. Conclusions 
In the context of stabilization policies, credibility will help to bring inflationary expectations 
down and to achieve the goal of disinflation.  On the other hand, the lack of policy credibility 
brings an additional restriction to the economic programs implemented by policy authorities.  If 
the economic agents expect that the policy authority cannot commit to his economic program, 
they will protect themselves from the consequences of the collapse of these programs. If the  
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economic agents believe that the stabilization program will fail, and the inflation rate will not 
be reduced, they will allocate some of their monetary assets in foreign currency to offset the loss 
in their purchasing power.  Therefore, the lack of credibility of the economic policy explains the 
presence of hysteresis in currency substitution. 
In order to examine the effect of credibility on currency substitution, I present a 
theoretical model where the economic agents form their expectations on the continuation of the 
economic policy based on their information about the fiscal deficit, inflation rates and the 
interest rate differential.  The estimation of the model involves uses Hamilton’s switching regime 
approach. 
The empirical evidence comes from the Peruvian experience with the orthodox 
stabilization program implemented in August 1990.  The period of the sample is from November 
1988 to June 1995.  The probability inferred by the economic agents about the sustainability of 
the economic policy is formulated using current and lagged values of government expenditures 
and lagged values of the inflation rate. The results of the estimation show that there are two 
different regimes in the government expenditure process.  According to the economic agents’ 
inferences, the stabilization program in Peru is not credible. 
Using the previous results, I examine the effect of policy credibility on the hysteresis in 
currency substitution.  Due to the lack of credibility in stabilization policies, economic agents 
may have maintained high expectations of inflation. Even if inflation rates decrease, the lack of 
policy credibility may cause economic agents to continue holding their assets in foreign 
currency.  For the estimation, the expected inflation rate is formulated using the probability built 
by the economic agents about the regime of the economic policy. Between August 1990 and  
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June 1995, the expected inflation rate that incorporates the inference of the economic agents 
about the credibility of the economic policy is statistically significant for the explanation of the 
change in the ratio of currency substitution.  The lack of credibility in the economic policy of the 




   
 
Table 1 
Peru : Unit Root Tests 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test 
   
  
 
 Government  Expenditures/ 














  Sample Period = September 1988 to June 1995 
  
  Number of Observations = 82 
 
  The figures correspond to the t-statistic of the following estimation: 
  ∆∆ ∆ yy y y t tt t t =+ + + t + + −− − α γ ββφ µ 11 12 2  
* indicates the rejection of the hypothesis γ = 0 (or the presence of unit root in the series) 







Results of  the Univariate Estimation 
Government Expenditures , Inflation rate and Interest Rate Differential 
 Peru : 1988:09 to 1995:06 
 
 
Coefficients    Government   Inflation   Interest  Rate 
    Expenditures       Rate      Differential 
        as  % of GDP       (%)          (%) 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
µ1    8.2219    33.1963   19.4319 
    (0.2994)   (1.9014)   (4.0151) 
 
µ2    5.8968    13.6462   0.6529 




1    2.3522    71.5119   356.2060 




2    0.9761    2687.82   0.3854 
    (0.2258)   (484.56)   (0.0705) 
 
p11    0.9348    0.9415    0.9457 
    (0.0462)   (0.0497)   (0.0458) 
 
p22    0.9179    0.9863    0.9863 
    (0.0454)   (0.0140)   (0.0141) 
 
Log-likelihood  -76.26    -337.01  -87.0866 
Standard deviations in parenthesis. 
All coefficients are significant at 95% confidence level.  
Note: The univariate estimation is based on a numerical optimization of the maximum likelihood 





Univariate Estimation: Government Expenditures as 
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